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3. Introduction 
This research is done in the framework of the International Policy Fellowship Program 
(IPF-Budapest) financed by the Open Society Institute (OSI). The research field is 
tobacco control economics while the analysis is primarily focused on Ukraine. The main 
objectives of the research are as follows: 
• To analyze tobacco control in Ukraine and evaluate the effectiveness of existing 
tobacco control policy;  
• To analyze international experience in applying economic tobacco control tools;  
• To conduct economic modeling of Ukraine's tobacco market, determine the most 
effective tools for tobacco control in Ukraine and evaluate their impact;   
• To develop tobacco control policy recommendations for the Ukrainian government. 
The data used for the analysis mainly come from the official sources (the State 
Statistics Committee of Ukraine, the National Bank of Ukraine). The data on advertising 
come from the Ukrainian Media monitor. In addition, a review of the press was 
performed. 
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4. Research Framework 
4.1. Goal 
This research is devoted to analyze different tobacco control tools and their effective 
utilization in Ukraine. While conducting the analysis, I considered the primary goal of the 
tobacco control policy, namely reducing consumption of tobacco products and smoking 
prevalence.  
However, in Ukraine, the government defines as another priority of tobacco taxation 
(one of the most effective tobacco control tools) – raising tax revenues. This issue is 
also analyzed in this research. The reason for doing so is the fact that the government 
is likely to be extremely sensitive to the revenue issue. Therefore, proper analysis of the 
fiscal outcomes of the tobacco control policy may be more convincing for the 
government. 
The majority of the analysis in this paper has been conducted based on Ukraine’s data. 
This was done in order to provide a country-specific research rather than “repeating 
international experience”. Although tobacco control measures and their effectiveness 
have been widely studied in other countries, in-depth country-specific analyses have the 
following advantages: 
• They are more easily accepted by the public at large and policy makers as they 
provide “real situation analysis” in a country. Consequently, such analysis is not 
subject to usual counterarguments that “our country is so specific that no 
international experience can work here”. 
• Such analysis allows to forecast more precisely the impact of using tobacco control 
tools (on consumption, tax revenues, etc.) in a country. 
• The strength of the impact of different tobacco control tools may indeed differ across 
countries and/or regions.  
4.2. Tobacco control tools 
The following tobacco control tools are analysed in this research: 
• Taxation; 
• Advertising and sponsorship restrictions/bans. 
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4.3. Approach 
This research is an attempt to analyze tobacco control in Ukraine from the economic 
perspective. The analysis is built on the fact that all tobacco control tools aim at 
influencing incentives and/or behavior of final consumers. For instance, tobacco 
taxation aims at making tobacco products more expensive for consumers who are 
expected to reduce their consumption given their limited incomes. Advertising bans are 
expected to eliminate tobacco industry’s influence on current and potential consumers’ 
behavior.   
Therefore, we are particularly interested in knowing the reaction of current and potential 
consumers to the implementation of different tobacco control tools. Consequently, the 
analysis is primarily focused on the demand side of the tobacco market. In some cases, 
the supply side is analyzed as well. 
4.4. Logic of the analysis 
Each section of the report is devoted to analysis of a tobacco control tool. 
First, a general overview of a policy tool is provided. 
Second, I analyze how the tool was used in Ukraine in previous years. This is 
supplemented with evaluation of the policy’s effectiveness in terms of reducing tobacco 
consumption and, where applicable, with estimates of its impact on government 
revenues.  
Third, I provide analysis of how the tool should be used effectively in order to achieve 
the primary tobacco control goal. This is done on the basis of available data for Ukraine 
and/or on the basis of international data. 
Fourth, I analyze different policy options. This includes analysis of the impact of different 
policy decisions on agents involved. Depending on the tool, the list of agents is 
determined. Where possible, the effect is quantified. Where applicable, the issue of 
smuggling is taken into consideration. 
Finally, policy recommendations will be elaborated. 
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5. Tools: Taxation1 
5.1. Overview 
Tobacco taxation is considered to be one of the most effective tools allowing to reduce 
tobacco consumption. Changes in taxation levels have direct impact on the price of 
cigarettes. The tool is especially powerful for lower-income countries where people are 
more sensitive to price changes given their low incomes. Therefore, the price elasticity 
of demand for cigarettes tends to be higher in such countries. Consequently, even small 
increases in the taxation level allow for notable decreases in tobacco consumption.  
5.2. Effectiveness of the Tool Usage in Ukraine 
Taxation is one of the few tobacco control tools used in Ukraine. Not surprisingly, the 
tool allows to reduce cigarette consumption in Ukraine. This is shown in the following 
figures.  
Figure 1. Cigarette prices vs. 
excise tax 
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Source: State Statistics Committee, Ukrainian Law, own 
calculations. 
Based on the 1997-2003 monthly data, figure 1 illustrates the interdependence between 
the cigarette excise tax level and the average cigarette price. As the figure reveals, 
there is a strong positive relationship between the two variables. This means that the 
tobacco companies shift at least part of the excise tax on consumers. In fact, as the 
estimated econometric model reveals, on average, if the excise rate per one pack of 
                                            
1 In order to conduct a detailed analysis of the tobacco market, an econometric model was estimated. A 
detailed description of the model is provided in Annex 1. 
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cigarettes grows by 0.1 UAH, the price of one pack increases by almost 0,14 UAH 
(based on the data for the period under consideration).  
5.2.1. Cigarette Demand in Ukraine 
Since reliable estimates of total cigarette consumption are missing in Ukraine, I will first 
analyze dynamics of legal cigarette sales. 
Four multinational companies are the major market players. These are Philip Morris, 
BAT, JTI, and Reemtsma. Each company has its factory in Ukraine. The companies 
entered Ukraine’s market in 1993-1994 mainly through buying-out old soviet tobacco 
factories. Despite this, in this research, we analyze data for the period from 1997 till 
2003, as prior to 1997 the tobacco companies had been modernizing old factories and 
developing their production capacities.  
Figure 2 shows the data for monthly production of cigarettes in Ukraine for the period 
from January 1997 till December 2003. It is clear from the figure that some seasonality 
is present in cigarette production, namely production is lower at the beginning and at the 
end of each year. However, as the trend line reveals, cigarette production in Ukraine is 
constantly growing despite some monthly fluctuations. 
Figure 3 reflects the other type of domestic companies’ activities, i.e. external trade. 
Starting 1999, Ukraine became a net exporter of cigarettes majority of which is sold to 
the former Soviet Union countries. 
Figure 2. Domestic cigarette 
production 
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Source: State Statistics Committee, own calculations. 
Figure 3. Cigarette exports and 
imports 
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The share of exports in total production is not significant. For instance, according to 
2001 data, cigarette exports accounted for only 4.3% of the production volume. Despite 
the fact that an increase in exports was accompanied by declining imports (1997-2000), 
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we can conclude that legal domestic cigarette consumption is growing in Ukraine. 
Figure 4 illustrates this point. A fall in legal domestic sales was observed in 1999 which 
was mainly caused by increased excise rates (the issue is illustrated below) and 
growing illegal imports2. 
Figure 4. Legal domestic sales of 
cigarettes in Ukraine 
0
25000
50000
75000
100000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
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Finally, figure 5 illustrates the other dependence: legal domestic sales of cigarettes 
versus the excise rate.  
Figure 5. Legal domestic sales of 
cigarettes and excise taxation 
(1997-2003) 
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Source: State Statistics Committee, Ukrainian Law, own 
calculations. 
It is clear from the chart that higher excise rates tend to decrease legal cigarette 
consumption in Ukraine. For example, in September 1998, the tax rate rose from 2 
EURO up to 3 EURO for filtered cigarettes and up to 2.3 EURO for no-filtered 
cigarettes. The rates grew further due to depreciation of Hryvnia with respect to EURO. 
                                            
2 The issue of smuggling is analyzed further in this report. 
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As of January 1999, the common tax rate of 2.5 EURO was set for both types of 
cigarettes. This represented a decline in the average weighted excise rate. However, 
due to further depreciation of the national currency, the tax rates increased (see data for 
late 1999). As can be seen from the graph, during this period (late 1998-1999), legal 
domestic sales of cigarettes declined.  
However, the question remains: What is the influence of higher taxes on total (legal + 
illegal) consumption? In order to answer this question, I will try to evaluate the total 
consumption using the estimated econometric model of the tobacco market. The major 
simplifying assumptions of such evaluation are as follows: 
• Cigarette demand is satisfied from the two sources: legal sales and smuggling; 
• Majority of smuggled cigarettes originate in Russia; 
• The major cause of smuggling is the excise tax differentials between Ukraine and 
Russia3. 
In accordance with the assumptions, total cigarette consumption equals legal 
consumption plus illegal consumption. While we know the volumes of legal sales, the 
volumes of illegal sales remain unknown. The approach to estimating illegal cigarette 
consumption is the following. 
Step 1 
The estimated econometric model contains a variable reflecting an incentive to smuggle 
cigarettes to Ukraine. This is expressed as a difference between the Ukrainian and 
Russian excise rates. At the first step, we take the estimated coefficient in front of the 
variable. The coefficient should be interpreted as follows: by how much legal domestic 
sales will fall due to increased difference in the excise rates4. The value of the 
coefficient is -0.07. Therefore, given the model specification, we may conclude that a 
10% increase in the Ukrainian excise rate or 10% decrease in the Russian excise rate 
will cause a 0.7% decline in legal sales due to increased smuggling.  
                                            
3 The only thing which the model makes possible, is estimating the volume of smuggling caused by tax 
differentials between the two countries. Therefore, the estimate should rather be considered as an 
estimate of bootlegging. However, according to numerous articles in the press and opinion of the industry 
representatives, the entire volume of smuggling can be explained by tax differentials. Therefore, my 
model allows testing this hypothesis. 
4 Since the variable is expressed in logs, the coefficient represents percentage change in legal sales due 
to 1% change in the variable. 
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Step 2 
At step 2, I will try to simulate what would be the volume of legal sales if the tax rates in 
the two countries are equal (no incentive to smuggle). In order to do so, I will 
hypothetically “increase” the Russian excise rate up to the level of Ukraine. This allows 
us to evaluate how many cigarettes are consumed by smokers in Ukraine who currently 
buy smuggled products but if the Russian tax is increased would switch to legal 
products. The following is shown using a formula: 
dD = 0.07 * dRUS_EX, 
where dD is the change in legal domestic sales, dRUS_EX — change in the Russian 
excise rate (in this case — increase), 0.07 — coefficient in front of the incentive variable 
from the model.  
The simulated situation is the following: Consumers buying illegal cigarettes 
hypothetically face higher excise rates and, hence prices, and start switching to legal 
products. 
The formula above allows estimating how much cigarettes former consumers of illegal 
products will buy in the legal market if the price of illegal cigarettes grow. Through such 
simulations, we may get an idea of how many illegal cigarettes is consumed now. 
In such a way, an estimate of the volume of smuggling is received. After that, I add up 
legal domestic sales and the estimated volume of smuggling (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6. Estimate of total 
cigarette consumption in Ukraine 
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Source: own calculations. 
Figure 7. Share of illegal tobacco 
products in total sales 
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As we see from the figure above, starting 2001, cigarette consumption has been 
growing in Ukraine at a rather high annual rate. At the same time, my estimates show 
that in the period of higher taxes (1999-2000, see figure 5), total cigarette consumption 
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was lower despite the growth in the volume of smuggling. Therefore, we may conclude 
that in terms of the primary tobacco control goal (reducing cigarette consumption), the 
taxation tool is effective even when smuggling exists. The current tax policy does not 
stimulate consumers to reduce cigarette consumption. At the same time, as the analysis 
reveals, the tool is powerful in reducing smoking in Ukraine. 
5.3. Achieving the Goal 
As the analysis above and the econometric model show, there is a need to increase 
tobacco taxes in Ukraine. This will both reduce cigarette consumption and increase 
government revenues from the excise tax on tobacco products. 
However, the government should be aware of several peculiarities of Ukraine’s tobacco 
market: 
• Demand elasticity is very low in Ukraine (-0.3 in the short run, and -0.48 in the long 
run), meaning that Ukrainian consumers are not very sensitive to price changes; 
• The elasticity of demand with respect to the excise rate is -0.06 in the short run, 
meaning that a 10% increase in the excise rate causes consumption to drop by only 
0.6% (in the long run the elasticity is higher -0.09); 
• Cigarette consumption grows with increased household incomes: if household 
incomes grow by 10%, cigarette consumption will increase by 2.1% in the short run 
and by 3.3% in the long run. As household incomes will grow (which is happening 
now) cigarette consumption will increase “naturally”. 
Regarding the government revenues, based on the econometric model estimated, we 
may conclude that the tax rate in Ukraine should be increased at least 2 times (this is 
depicted in the graph below). The graph below shows the so-called Laffer curve 
reflecting the relationship between the tax rate and the tax revenues received. 
According to economic theory, for most good the following hold true: 
• If the tax rate for the good is small, initial increases in the tax rate lead to higher tax 
revenues as in such a case consumer behavior is not very much affected. 
• There is a certain tax rate applying of which gives maximum revenue from the tax on 
the good. 
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• If the tax rate is increased above the revenue-maximizing point, tax revenues may 
fall as consumers will adjust their behaviour and the price elasticity of demand will 
increase significantly.  
As can be seen from the graph, currently, Ukraine’s tobacco market is on the upward 
sloping part of the Laffer curve (below the revenue-maximizing point) meaning that 
increasing the tax rate will give more revenues to the government. 
Figure 8. Laffer curve for tobacco 
excise tax in Ukraine 
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Source: Own calculations based on the estimated econometric model. 
Note: An arrow in the graph shows current position of Ukraine. 
Since this represents calculations from the model, it should be noticed that such a large 
increase may cause structural changes in the model equations. Therefore, the numeric 
result (namely, two-fold increase in the tax rate) should be treated with care. However, 
the definite outcome of the analysis is that at the current point, higher taxes will increase 
budget revenues from cigarette taxation. Next section provides overview of some policy 
options available for the government. 
5.4. Policy Options 
In the view of the above analysis, this section provides policy options available to the 
government. Besides providing policy options themselves, I will give a brief analysis 
and/or estimates of the impact of such policies on the parties involved. Regarding 
tobacco taxation, consequences for the following agents will be analyzed: 
• Smokers who will benefit from their improved health due to lower smoking; 
• Government. Besides public health concerns, it is interested in increasing tax 
revenues and reducing the volume of smuggling; 
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• The tobacco industry often using a number of arguments against increasing tobacco 
taxes and being able to effectively persuade the government5. In this regard the 
impact of taxation on tobacco industry employment and revenues will be analyzed 
as well. 
Basically, the overall recommendation that can be drawn from the above analysis is that 
the government should increase tobacco taxes. In this regard, two questions should be 
answered: “How to increase taxes?” and “What will be the impact of such policy on the 
agents involved?”  
The issue of the taxation principle (namely, specific taxation versus ad-valorem or 
mixed taxation) is not analyzed in this paper. Despite the fact that the issue is often 
debated in Ukraine, it is clear that the tax rate itself is more important since for each 
specific tax rate an ad-valorem equivalent rate could be calculated.  
The choice of the taxation system highly depends on the government’s ability to ensure 
tax revenues and compliance with the tax legislation. As shown in many research 
papers, both taxation systems (specific and ad-valorem or mixed) have pros and cons. 
For instance:  
• Ad-valorem system may be good for countries with high inflation as the tax amount 
automatically adjusts with the overall inflation. For countries with moderate inflation 
the specific taxation system may do the same if, for instance, the law on taxation 
includes the clause on annual adjustment of the tax rate in accordance with the 
inflation rate. 
• Specific system may be especially good for countries with poor enforcement of the 
tax legislation as this system is easier to administer given that the tax base is the 
physical volume of the good produced. 
From the above, we may conclude that the choice of the taxation system is more related 
to the issue of ensuring collection of revenues based on a certain tax rate. At the same 
time, the issue of the tax revenues is primarily connected with the tax rate. 
                                            
5 In my opinion, it is necessary to analyze the industry as well since it is sometimes claimed that the 
industry is an important foreign investor into Ukraine’s economy. Given the limited amount of foreign 
investment in Ukraine, the government may find this issue very important. 
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Therefore, the taxation options analyzed in this paper deal with the tax rate and not with 
the taxation principles. The following major options of tobacco taxation are analyzed in 
this paper: 
• Option 1. The tax rate remains unchanged. 
• Option 2. During next 2 years, the tax rate increases by 25% each January. 
• Option 3. Starting January 1, 2005, the tax rate is increased by 50%.  
Of course, the list of options is not exhaustive. My major goal is to determine what will 
be the effect of a one-time large increase and a gradual increase in the tax rate. These 
options are compared with the “doing nothing” policy option. 
The following graphs illustrate the impact of the three policy options on cigarette prices, 
cigarette consumption, and government revenues6. The forecast horizon is 2004-2008. 
Figure 9. Policy options and 
cigarette prices 
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Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 10. Policy options and 
cigarette consumption 
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Source: Own calculations. 
Note: Cigarette consumption was seasonally adjusted. 
As can be seen from the graphs, under the “doing nothing” scenario, cigarette prices 
are lower, as well as government revenues, while cigarette consumption is higher. The 
two scenarios envisaging tax increases differs only in the indicators for the year 2005 
when the “gradual increase” scenario gives lower revenues and prices together with 
higher cigarette consumption if compared to the “one-time increase” scenario. After 
2005, the indicators are roughly the same under the both scenarios envisaging tax 
                                            
6 The simulations are made based on the estimated econometric model of the tobacco market. 
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increases. Therefore, it may be better for the government to choose the “gradual 
increase” scenario as it maybe politically easier to implement. 
Figure 11. Policy options and 
government revenues 
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Source: Own calculations. 
The table below provides comparative analysis of the outcomes of the three policy 
options. 
Table 1. Tobacco taxation: Comparative analysis of the policy 
options 
 Option 1  
(“doing nothing”) 
Option 2  
(gradual increase) 
Option 3  
(one-time increase) 
Consumption Gradually increasing Two-step decline, then –
gradual growth. At the 
end of the forecasting 
period, consumption is 
lower compared to basic 
scenario and equal to 
that under “one-time 
increase” scenario 
One-time decline, then –
gradual growth. At the 
end of the forecasting 
period, consumption is 
lower compared to basic 
scenario and equal to 
that under “gradual 
increase” scenario 
Government revenues Lower than under other 
scenarios 
After the two increases 
in the tax rate, revenues 
are the same as under 
the scenario 3, higher 
Cumulatively for the 
whole forecasting 
period, the revenues are 
larger than under other 
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than under scenario 1. scenarios. 
Cigarette bootlegging 
into Ukraine7 
Unchanged. Slight two-step increase. Slight one-time increase. 
Tobacco industry 
revenues 
Not affected by the 
government. Gradually 
growing due to 
increased consumption. 
Decline in two steps. 
Given the low elasticity 
of demand, the industry 
can offset the effect 
through increasing the 
price further. 
One-time decline. Given 
the low elasticity of 
demand, the industry 
can offset the effect 
through increasing the 
price further. 
Tobacco industry 
employment 
The effect is not clear. The issue is analyzed further in this report. 
 
Source: Author. 
As it was already mentioned, changes in tobacco taxation are expected to influence two 
particular areas where the effect of such policy is not clear enough. The areas are 
employment in the tobacco industry and smuggling. These are analyzed below. 
5.4.1. Employment 
It is often claimed that the tobacco industry is an important employer for the domestic 
economy. Moreover, the industry claims that tobacco control measures (and taxation in 
particular) will reduce the industry output and therefore, it will be forced to lay out their 
workers.   
Figure 12. Employment in 
tobacco industry8 
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Source: State Statistics Committee, own calculations. 
Figure 13. Indices of employment 
and production, 1998=100 
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7 Analyzed further in this section in more detail. 
8 Please, note that the data for 2000 do not include employment at the Kyiv tobacco factory. This is due to 
some gaps in the statistics by the State Statistics Committee. 
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Figure 13 plots the two data series, namely, tobacco industry output and total 
employment in the industry9. For the ease of comparison, the data is expressed in the 
form of indices where both of them were set equal to 100 in 1998.  
As we can see, there is no strict relationship between the two indicators. In general, if 
we compare 1998 and 2002, we can conclude that while cigarette production increased 
by 37%, employment in the industry declined by more than a quarter.   
Therefore, based on the data analyzed, we cannot predict the employment effect of 
reduced (increased) cigarette production as this seems to be determined by the tobacco 
companies’ employment policy and changes in technologies used in cigarette 
production.  
Reduced cigarette production in Ukraine is unlikely to affect farmers growing tobacco. 
Despite an overall increase in the cigarette production during the period under 
consideration, tobacco growing is declining in Ukraine. This is depicted in the following 
charts. 
Figure 14. Total area under 
tobacco crops 
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Source: State Statistics Committee. 
Figure 15. Total growing of 
tobacco 
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Source: State Statistics Committee. 
5.4.2. Smuggling 
Especially during 1999, the peculiarity of the Ukrainian cigarette market was the 
availability of cheaper smuggled cigarettes. Sometimes, illegal cigarettes were two 
times cheaper compared to legally produced cigarettes. Of course, this had a direct 
impact on tobacco control efforts of the government.  
                                            
9 The numbers for the industry employment include only workers involved in cigarette manufacturing. 
Therefore, tobacco farmers and workers engaged in primary tobacco processing and distribution of final 
products are not taken into account. 
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Figure 16. Excise rates in Ukraine 
and Russia (1997-2002) 
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Source: State Statistics Committee, Ukrainian and Russian Law, 
own calculations. 
It is often claimed that majority of smuggled cigarettes was brought from Russia and 
Moldova. Among the major causes of smuggling, the industry and many experts claim 
the difference in the taxation levels in Ukraine and its neighboring countries. This is 
depicted in the figure 16 above. Indeed, sales of smuggled cigarettes increased 
dramatically in the period of large tax differentials (1999-2000).  
At the same time, as was analysed earlier in this report, the estimated econometric 
model of Ukraine’s tobacco market (see Appendix 1) indicates that a 10% increase in 
the Ukrainian excise rate will lead to at most 0.07% drop in legal domestic sales due to 
increased smuggling. As the above analysis showed (see Figure 7), the model provides 
estimates which are close to the estimates provided by experts including those from the 
industry10.  
The huge volume of smuggling in 1999 was caused by really large differentials in the 
tax rates between the two countries. In that year, the tax rates differed by over 6 times. 
However, in the next year, the share of smuggling dropped to around 14% of the 
market, while the Ukrainian excise rate was still 3.5 times higher than the Russian rate.  
                                            
10 For instance, in 1999, experts claimed that about 30% of the market is covered by illegal sales, while 
the model provides estimate of about 28%. 
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As we can see from the graph above, in 2003, the tax rates in the two countries did not 
differ significantly, while the estimated volume of smuggling was negligible. Therefore, 
even noticeable increases in the Ukrainian tax rate will not cause extensive smuggling. 
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6. Tools: Advertising Restrictions/Bans 
6.1. Overview 
Advertising restrictions/bans are regarded to be effective tools for reducing tobacco 
consumption. However, implementation of this tool affects a larger number of agents 
who may oppose to such a policy. Besides the government receiving revenues from 
taxes on advertising, the advertising industry itself is likely to oppose such a policy. 
Therefore, a proper analysis of the policy outcomes is needed or otherwise it will not be 
accepted. 
6.2. Effectiveness of the Tool Usage in Ukraine 
Until now, Ukraine has enjoyed some restrictions on tobacco advertising. In particular, 
there is a complete ban on TV and radio advertising of tobacco products. However, 
advertising in printed mass-media and out-door advertising is not prohibited.  
Consequently, according to the Ukrainian Media Monitor, the tobacco companies are at 
the top of the list of the largest advertisers using both types of advertising. Moreover, if 
we consider out-door advertising, cigarettes are the most heavily advertised good both 
in terms of the number of advertisements and in terms of the amounts spent.  
Figure 17. Out-door tobacco advertising expenditures, 
1999-2001, thousands USD per month 
 
Source: Ukrainian Media Monitor. 
Note: the three lines in the graph correspond to three goods with the largest advertising budgets: 
tobacco (the upper line), telecommunications (the line in the middle), and alcoholic drinks (the lower 
line). 
Page 22 
Figure 15 illustrates the dynamics of out-door advertising expenditures in Ukraine for 
the most heavily advertised goods. This is monthly data for the period from January 
1999 till July 2001. The advertising budgets are expressed in thousands USD. As we 
can see from the graph, tobacco is the most heavily advertised good (the upper line in 
the graph). 
Figure 16 shows the dynamics of out-door tobacco advertising for the period from 1997 
till 2003 (monthly data). This is expressed in the number of out-door boards of tobacco 
advertising. The data is given for 24 oblast centres of Ukraine, the city of Simferopol 
(the capital of the Crimea Republic), and the city of Sevastopol located in the Crimea. 
While the data do not cover entire Ukraine (since the monitoring is not conducted for all 
settlements), it allows to analyze the advertising dynamics. The source for the data is 
the Ukrainian Media Monitor.  
Figure 18. Out-door advertising of tobacco products 
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Source: Ukrainian Media Monitor. 
The estimated trend-line in the graph clearly indicates that during the period under 
consideration the volume of out-door tobacco advertising has been growing. For 
example, in 2004, the volume of advertising was two times larger compared to 1997. In 
general, the volume of advertising is larger for cities having bigger populations. In 
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monetary terms, in 2003, the industry spent over 20 million USD on out-door advertising 
in the cities under consideration. 
Therefore, at least a part of the increase in legal domestic sales may be attributed to 
increased advertising expenditures. In particular, as the estimated econometric model of 
the market shows, a 10% increase in the number of out-door boards leads to a 0.73% 
growth in legal domestic sales of cigarettes. Of course, the opposite holds true: a 10% 
decrease in the advertising volumes causes a 0.73% decline in domestic sales. 
Due to dependence of present cigarette consumption on past consumption, in the long-
run, demand is even more sensitive to changes in the volume of advertising. For 
instance, under the one-time 10% increase in the advertising volumes, cigarette 
consumption will grow 1.14% in the long run11. 
To sum up: starting from the year 2000, a gradual decline in cigarette prices 
accompanied by the increased advertising expenditures had its effect: cigarette sales 
started growing (see above). 
6.3. Achieving the goal 
As it is clear from the above analysis, advertising is a very powerful tool for promoting 
cigarette consumption in Ukraine. Moreover, the tool is actively used by the industry 
which affects current consumption and will have larger long-term effects. Therefore, 
advertising ban is a good tool for Ukraine’s government if the major goal of the policy is 
to decrease cigarette consumption due to public health considerations. 
6.4. Policy options 
Basically, there are two main options regarding tobacco advertising: ban it or not. As 
many research papers showed, partial restrictions on advertising are not effective in 
reducing smoking. The same holds true for Ukraine: although tobacco advertising is 
restricted (e.g. ban of advertising on TV, radio, some restrictions on advertising tobacco 
products in press), cigarette consumption is growing to some extent due to increased 
volume of advertising by the tobacco industry. 
In case there are no changes to the legislation regarding tobacco advertising, one may 
expect continuation of the growing trend of the tobacco advertising volumes (since this 
                                            
11 Technically, under the long run we understand infinity. 
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turns to be an effective tool for the tobacco industry to promote cigarette consumption). 
As was described earlier, this will lead to increased cigarette consumption having even 
larger effect in the long-run (due to the positive impact of current consumption on future 
consumption volumes). 
In case tobacco advertising is banned, cigarette consumption will definitely decline 
leading to improved public health. Unfortunately, it is not possible to precisely quantify 
the reduction in cigarette consumption due to banned tobacco advertising since this 
represents a structural shift in the estimated model. However, as was shown earlier, the 
impact of advertising on cigarette consumption is relatively large. For instance, in terms 
of promoting cigarette consumption, increasing advertising by 4% is equivalent to 
reducing the average price of cigarettes by 1%.  
Another point that should be analyzed is the impact of the tobacco advertising ban on 
the advertising industry. In this regard, we may conclude the following12: 
First, tobacco advertising constitutes a significant share of the total volume of outdoor 
advertising (over 30% of all outdoor advertising expenditures as of 2001), while the 
share in printed mass-media is moderate (around 3% of all press advertising 
expenditures as of 2001). At the same time, the shares of outdoor and printed media 
advertising in the advertising market comprise around 10% each. Therefore, tobacco 
advertising ban will mainly affect outdoor advertising sector, while the advertising 
market as a whole will not be greatly affected by the ban.   
Second, according to 2003 advertising market overview13, the share of outdoor tobacco 
advertising in the total volume of outdoor advertising started to decline. Compared to 
2002, in 2003, the share of the category “Tobacco” dropped by approximately 6%, while 
the total market grew by over 30%. Such a growth in the market was mainly caused by 
increased volumes (and market shares) of advertising of other categories (for instance, 
telecommunications and cars), representing dynamically developing markets. 
Finally, while making decision regarding the ban of tobacco advertising, the government 
should be interested in knowing attitude of the general public towards such a policy. As 
surveys in different countries reveal, usually, the public supports such actions by the 
                                            
12 The data on advertising come from the Ukrainian Media Monitor. 
13 “Outdoor advertising market. Ukraine. 2003”, Media Expert magazine. 
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government. According to a nation-wide survey conducted in Ukraine in November 
2000, 49% of respondents supported a total ban of tobacco advertising14.  
I did not find results of any nation-wide representative surveys devoted to the issue and 
conducted after 2000. However, an on-line survey was conducted by the Ukrtutun 
association of tobacco producers. Below, you can see the results of the survey. Over 
68% of the Ukrtutun internet site visitors who participated in the survey voted in favor of 
the ban of alcohol and tobacco advertising while almost 22% voted against the ban. 
Table 2. Survey: What is your attitude towards 
banning advertising of alcohol and tobacco? 
 
Support 68.13% 
Do not support 21.97% 
Do not care 9.89% 
Source: On-line survey of the Ukrtutun Association of tobacco producers 
(www.ukrtobacco.kiev.ua, last accessed on May, 20, 2004), N=273. 
 
                                            
14 See ADIC-Ukraine, “Economics of tobacco control in Ukraine from the public health perspective”, 2001. 
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7. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The following major conclusions and policy recommendations can be drawn from the 
above analysis: 
• Cigarette consumption in Ukraine is growing quickly. The major factors determining 
the trend are decreasing prices, increasing volumes of advertising, and growing 
household incomes. 
• Ukrainian consumers have low sensitivity to changes in the price of cigarettes. 
Consequently, if the government intends to reduce smoking, large increases in the 
excise rate are needed. 
• The excise tax is a powerful tool for reducing cigarette consumption and increasing 
state budget revenues. The tax rates in Ukraine can be increased at least two times. 
This will reduce cigarette consumption, increase budget revenues, and will have only 
moderate effect on the volume of smuggling to Ukraine, while more tough 
government control over smuggling may reduce the volume of smuggling. 
• Advertising is a powerful tool for promoting cigarette consumption in Ukraine. The 
ban of tobacco advertising will definitely reduce cigarette consumption while the 
effect on the advertising industry as a whole will not be dramatic. According to some 
surveys, there is a public support in favour of the tobacco advertising ban. 
• Tobacco control measures and subsequent declines in cigarette production will not 
represent a big problem for farmers growing tobacco: currently, despite cigarette 
production is growing, tobacco farming is declining. Regarding the employees 
involved in cigarette production, the effect of reduced production is not clear. In 
recent years, employment in cigarette manufacturing declined despite an extremely 
fast growth of cigarette production. Therefore, no positive correlation was found 
between the production volumes and employment. 
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8. Appendix 1. Estimated Econometric Model of 
Tobacco Market in Ukraine 
The model consists of three equations estimated simultaneously: demand curve, price 
equation, and the Laffer curve reflecting the relationship between the tax revenues and 
different factors affecting the revenues. The three equations describe Ukraine’s tobacco 
market. While estimating the model, I used monthly data from January 1997 till 
December 2003. All estimated coefficients are significant at least at the 10% 
significance level. In general, the model has good technical characteristics indicating no 
problems with the model specification. Majority of the coefficients are significant even at 
the 1% significance level. The estimation output is provided below. 
System: SYS01 
Estimation Method: Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1997:02 2003:12 
Included observations: 83 
Total system (unbalanced) observations 243 
Convergence achieved after: 6 weight matricies, 7 total coef iterations 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 3.051610 0.475339 6.419864 0.0000
C(2) -0.306515 0.172302 -1.778946 0.0766
C(3) 0.213723 0.051543 4.146537 0.0000
C(4) -0.069672 0.031967 -2.179531 0.0304
C(5) 0.359197 0.064713 5.550595 0.0000
C(6) 0.072949 0.039596 1.842324 0.0668
C(7) 0.107662 0.062204 1.730801 0.0849
C(20) -0.158323 0.028624 -5.531119 0.0000
C(21) 1.387011 0.175794 7.889990 0.0000
C(22) 0.000425 5.74E-05 7.414535 0.0000
C(23) 0.663252 0.038034 17.43855 0.0000
C(24) -0.022353 0.011158 -2.003243 0.0464
C(25) -0.130373 0.022009 -5.923703 0.0000
C(26) -0.043297 0.012118 -3.572948 0.0004
C(27) 0.091766 0.008091 11.34137 0.0000
C(28) -0.030013 0.006163 -4.869729 0.0000
C(29) -0.086319 0.010763 -8.020281 0.0000
C(40) -13.01157 2.618097 -4.969856 0.0000
C(41) -2.367462 0.376913 -6.281183 0.0000
C(42) -0.500220 0.161933 -3.089055 0.0023
C(43) 9.487484 1.474044 6.436363 0.0000
C(44) 0.000897 0.000312 2.872258 0.0045
C(45) 0.000581 0.000294 1.978683 0.0491
C(46) 0.199781 0.074559 2.679505 0.0079
Determinant residual covariance 8.24E-07   
Equation: LOG(DOM_SALSA)=C(1)+C(2)*LOG(P)+C(3)*LOG(HISA) 
        +C(4)*(LOG(UKR_EX(-1))-LOG(RUS_EX(-4)))+C(5) 
        *LOG(DOM_SALSA(-2))+C(6)*LOG((AD_OUT_SA+AD_OUT_SA( 
        -1)+AD_OUT_SA(-2))/3)+C(7)*BEFORE_CRISIS*LOG(P) 
Observations: 80 
R-squared 0.870425     Mean dependent var 8.607452
Adjusted R-squared 0.859775     S.D. dependent var 0.228906
S.E. of regression 0.085718     Sum squared resid 0.536368
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Durbin-Watson stat 2.050141    
Equation: (P)=C(20)*TAX_SYS+C(21)*(UKR_EX/50)+C(22)*USD+C(23)
        *P(-1)+C(24)*V1997+C(25)*V1999+C(26)*V1998+C(27)*CRISIS 
        +C(28)*V1999_2+C(29)*V1998_2 
Observations: 83 
R-squared 0.993330     Mean dependent var 0.456445
Adjusted R-squared 0.992508     S.D. dependent var 0.084597
S.E. of regression 0.007322     Sum squared resid 0.003914
Durbin-Watson stat 1.691491    
Equation: (REV)=C(40)+C(41)*(UKR_EX(-1)-RUS_EX(-4))+C(42) 
        *UKR_EX^2+C(43)*UKR_EX+C(44)*HISA+C(45)*(DOM_SALES( 
        -2))+C(46)*REV(-1) 
Observations: 80 
R-squared 0.852284     Mean dependent var 19.13373
Adjusted R-squared 0.840143     S.D. dependent var 5.709234
S.E. of regression 2.282671     Sum squared resid 380.3729
Durbin-Watson stat 1.817461    
8.1.  Explanation of variables and model specification 
Below, I provide explanation of the variables used in the model, as well as peculiarities 
of the model specification.  
8.1.1. Demand equation 
The equation was estimated in logarithmic form. In such a case, the coefficients in front 
of the variables represent elasticity of demand with respect to the variables. In other 
words, the coefficients show by how many percent the demand will change due to 1% 
change in independent variables. 
DOM_SALES  
– legal domestic sales of cigarettes (domestic production + imports – exports), 
thousands sticks. 
DOM_SALSA  
– seasonally adjusted legal domestic sales. The adjustment was done since cigarette 
sales reveal seasonality. This is introduced in the model both as a dependent variable 
(in the demand equation) and independent variable, the latter reflecting the assumption 
of consumers’ myopic addiction behavior. As an independent variable, this was 
introduced with the lag equal to 2 periods. 
P 
– average weighted cigarette price, inflation-adjusted UAH per pack. To calculate the 
average weighted price, I took prices for filtered and non-filtered cigarettes. After that, 
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the prices were weighted by the shares of filtered and non-filtered cigarettes in a certain 
month. 
HISA  
– seasonally adjusted real household incomes, million UAH. Nominal incomes were first 
adjusted by the CPI and then adjusted seasonally. This indicator reflects overall 
changes in the well-being of Ukrainians. 
UKR_EX 
– inflation-adjusted average weighted cigarette excise rate in Ukraine, UAH per 1000 
sticks. As in the case of prices, I used shares of filtered and non-filtered cigarettes as 
weights to calculate average weighted excise rate inUkraine. 
RUS_EX  
– inflation-adjusted average cigarette excise rate in Russia, expressed in UAH per 1000 
sticks.  
Difference between excise rates in Ukraine and Russia 
Another variable – the difference between the Ukrainian and Russian excise rates – is 
introduced in the model to reflect the economic incentive to smuggle from Russia to 
Ukraine. Having introduced this variable, we can obtain an unbiased estimate of the 
price elasticity and evaluate how much additional smuggling is caused by changes in 
the tax differential. If the variable is not introduced in the model, the estimate of the 
price elasticity of demand is likely to be biased, as the coefficient in front of the price 
would reflect changes in demand both due to reduced consumption and people 
switching to consumption of illegal cigarettes. Since the variable is introduced, the two 
effects are estimated separately: the coefficient in front of the price shows by how much 
legal sales will change due to people increasing/decreasing consumption, while the 
coefficient in front of the tax difference variable reflects by how much legal sales will fall 
due to consumers switching to illegal cigarettes. 
The variable representing the tax differentials is expressed in lagged values of 
Ukrainian and Russian tax rates. The specification in lags was used to account for some 
peculiarities of smuggling to Ukraine. Below, I provide explanations. 
First, it takes time for smugglers to identify the difference or change in taxes (and 
hence, prices) and to establish channels for distribution of illegal products. 
Consequently, a change in the excise rate in Russia will not influence Ukrainian market 
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immediately. Instead, some time will pass before the effect will be felt in the Ukrainian 
market. One example when there was a dramatic drop in the Russian excise tax is the 
financial crisis of 1998. After the depreciation of the ruble, the excise tax in Russia fell in 
real terms and in hryvnia equivalent. As tobacco producers claimed, after the crisis, the 
massive inflow of illegal cigarettes started after 4-5 months.  
Second, consumers may be “brand-addicted”. This means that a consumer is used to 
smoking a particular cigarette brand. Hence, if his “favourite” brand becomes relatively 
more expensive the consumer my not switch to other cheaper (smuggled) brands 
immediately. Instead, the consumer will look for a smuggled brand that is more close to 
his taste. This process will take some time, and the consumer will switch to smuggled 
cigarettes after a certain period of time. 
Third, there is a necessity to transport smuggled cigarettes to more distant regions. In 
the case of smuggling from Russia, initially, smuggled cigarettes entered the markets of 
Eastern oblasts of Ukraine that are located directly at the border with Russia. However, 
in order to extend their markets, smugglers need to move to other oblasts, which are 
more distant. This requires establishing new distribution chains in other oblasts, which 
in turn requires certain expenditures and time. 
AD_OUT_SA 
– seasonally adjusted volumes of outdoor advertising, number of billboards in oblast 
centres of Ukraine, the cities of Simferopol and Sevastopol. In the model, I used 
average advertising volumes for the current month and two previous months. Such 
specification was chosen in order to account for the effect of advertising distributed over 
time. 
BEFORE_CRISIS 
– a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period before the financial crisis in Russia (before 
September 1998) and 0 – after that time. The reason for introducing the variable was to 
account for the fact that prior to the financial crisis, producers had been introducing new 
cigarette brands to the market and increasing their production. This led to consumers 
switching from traditionally smuggled cigarettes to locally produced cigarettes. The 
dummy was multiplied by the price to account for the fact that consumers were less 
sensitive to changes in the price of legal cigarettes. 
8.1.2. Price equation 
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UKR_EX/50 
– this is the same variable used before (Ukrainian excise rate). However, in the price 
equation, this was divided by 50 to calculate the excise rate per one pack of cigarettes. 
Such modification has no impact on the estimation results, however, makes it easier to 
interpret the results as the dependent variable is the price per one pack of cigarettes. 
USD  
– exchange rate of Hryvnia with respect to the US dollar. This variable was introduced 
mainly as a proxy for the missing data on the price of raw tobacco used in cigarette 
production. Since the majority of raw tobacco is imported to Ukraine, the exchange rate 
can be a good proxy for the raw tobacco price if we assume that the world price of 
tobacco did not change significantly over the period under consideration. 
P(-1) 
– this is the price lagged one period. The variable was introduced to account for some 
dynamics in the cigarette price. 
V1997, V1998, V1999 
– the dummy variables equal to 1 in the corresponding years. The reason for 
introducing the variables is the necessity to model producer behaviour more accurately. 
The point is that for these three years, the excise tax increases were planned in 
advance and included in the legislation. Therefore, producers were aware of the future 
tax increases and acted correspondingly: instead of increasing prices in January of 
each year (when the tax rates were raised), they did this gradually during previous and 
current years. Consequently, an increase in the tax rate on January 1 of each of the 
years did not lead to dramatic changes in the price. 
TAX_SYS 
– a dummy equal to 1 in the period starting January 2000 till present. This represents a 
change in the principle of calculating excise taxes in Ukraine. Starting January 2000, 
excise rates have been expressed in the national currency instead of EURO. In fact, in 
January 2000, excise rates were significantly reduced. However, producers did not 
decrease prices so significantly. Instead, they, probably, increased their profits. The 
dummy was included to simulate this peculiarity of producer behaviour. 
CRISIS 
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– the dummy was introduced to account for changes in producer behaviour caused by 
the Russian financial crisis and subsequent rapid changes in exchange rates of major 
currencies with respect to Hryvnia. The dummy was set equal to 1 for September and 
October 1998.  
V1998_2 
– the dummy to simulate changes in producer behaviour caused by the expected (and 
envisaged in the legislation) increase in the tax rate. The meaning of the dummy is the 
same as for V1997, V1998, and V1999. The dummy was set equal to 1 for the period of 
increased taxes (September-December 1998). 
V1999_2 
– a dummy equal to 1 for the last three months of 1999. This variable was included in 
the model to simulate changes in producer behaviour caused by an unexpected 
depreciation of the national currency with respect to EURO (and corresponding increase 
in the excise tax).   
8.1.3. The Laffer curve 
REV  
– government revenues from excise taxation of tobacco products, million inflation-
adjusted Hryvnia. 
Besides the excise rate, as explanation variables, major factors affecting demand were 
included. This was done since government revenues are determined not only by the tax 
rate, but also by the behaviour of consumers (the demand side).  
